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CIVIL RIGHTS: Closing the Back Door to the
Discriminating Private Club
Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n'
The Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association, Inc., was formed in
1958 for the purpose of operating a swimming pool in Silver Spring,
Maryland. The pool was initially financed by subscriptions from per-
sons residing in the area, and is still maintained through members'
contributions. 2 Membership in the Association is open to those resi-
dents of the area within a three-quarter mile radius of the pool who
are accepted by the existing membership; members may be taken from
outside the area as long as they do not exceed thirty percent of the
total membership.
Dr. and Mrs. Harry Press were black homeowners living within
the three-quarter mile radius. In 1968, Dr. Press attempted to obtain
an application for membership. This request was refused, admittedly
on the basis of his race. The Presses and three other plaintiffs' brought
a class action in the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and damages.4
They contended that the denial of membership on the basis of race
constituted a violation of three federal statutes. They first claimed
violation of that part of section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1981,' which gives all persons the same
1. 451 F.2d 1211 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 406 U.S. 916 (1972).
2. Present operations are financed by an initiation fee of $375 and annual dues
of $50 to $60.
3. Mr. and Mrs. Murray Tillman were white members of Wheaton-Haven
who invited a black guest, Mrs. Grace Rosner, to the pool. She was admitted on
her first visit, but thereafter was denied admission under a new rule limiting guests
to relatives of members. Mrs. Rosner is the fifth plaintiff.
4. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Civil No. 21,294 (D. Md.
July 8, 1970).
5. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, reenacted with minor
changes by Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144 (codified as 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1970)). It reads:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefits of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
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right to make and enforce contracts as white citizens, asserting that
membership is a contract between member and Association, and plain-
tiffs were denied, because of their race, the right whites would have
had to make such a contract. Their second claim was under that por-
tion of the 1866 Act now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1982,6 which gives
all persons the same right enjoyed by whites to convey, purchase and
hold property. They contended that membership is personal property
subject to the 1866 Act and that the transfer of membership was in-
cident to a sale of real property, still more clearly within section 1982.
Third, they claimed that the discriminatory refusal was in violation
of title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,7 which bars discrimination
in places of public accommodation. The district court granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendants.'
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the decision.9
The court agreed that Wheaton-Haven was a bona fide private club and
thus exempt from the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.10 It
also held that actions brought under the 1866 Act were subject by
implication to the private club exemption contained in the 1964 Act,
6. Section 1982 states: "All citizens of the United States shall have the same
right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 201 et seq., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a thru 2000a-6 (1970).
Section 2000a (a) states: "All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any
place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimination or
segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin."
8. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Civil No. 21,294 (D. Md.
July 8, 1970). The court found that Wheaton-Haven was a private club and thus
exempt from coverage under title II, and that the case was distinguishable from
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969), discussed infra Part II.
since membership in the Wheaton-Haven pool was not incident to the purchase of
a home in the area.
9. Tillman v. Wheaton Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 451 F.2d 1211 (4th
Cir. 1971).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970), discussed infra at III. It seems certain that
Wheaton-Haven would be covered by the 1964 Act were it not for the exemption.
First, it falls within the definition of a place of entertainment under the statute,
because the Supreme Court has held that such recreational facilities as swimming
pools are places of entertainment. Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969), rev'g 395
F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1968), and Kyles v. Paul, 263 F. Supp. 412 (E.D. Ark. 1967) (which
had held that such facilities were not places of entertainment within the statutory
language). Furthermore, the operations of the Wheaton-Haven affect commerce, as
that concept has been defined in cases under the civil rights statute (see note 22
infra). The Wheaton-Haven pool was constructed by a Virginia contractor, and
such equipment as the pumps and vending machines was manufactured outside of
Maryland. The sources of the entertainment have, therefore, moved in commerce.
See, e.g., Daniel v. Paul, supra (nexus with commerce established where boats used
at facility in Arkansas were manufactured and sold in Oklahoma).
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thus avoiding the need to consider whether membership was either a
contract or personal property. It further found that no cause of action
was otherwise stated under the old Civil Rights Act, because there was
no transfer of a right incident to a real property transaction falling
within that section. The court took pains to distinguish the Wheaton-
Haven fact situation from that in the case of Sullivan v. Little Hunt-
ing Park, Inc.," in which the Supreme Court had held that transfers
of membership incident to sales or leases of real property were subject
to the requirements of section 1982.
Judge Butzner dissented in Wheaton-Haven 2 arguing first that
the facts of the case were indistinguishable from those in Sullivan v.
Little Hunting Park and second that Wheaton-Haven was not a bona
fide private club because race was the sole basis for excluding appli-
cants for membership.
Three important elements make the decision significant. First is
the holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1866, resurrected for use
against private individuals in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,"5 was
modified in its scope by the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Second is the
attempt to limit sections 1981 and 1982 to transfers of present valuable
rights incident to transactions in real property, an apparent constric-
tion of the implications of Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park. The last
is the conclusion that an organization which has many features of a
private club will not lose its exemption from the operation of the public
accommodations law solely because its only membership criterion
is race.
I. ADDING THE PRIVATE CLUB EXEMPTION TO THE
1866 ACT: REPEAL BY IMPLICATION
When Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964,14 the de-
bates reflected a belief that it was the first federal legislation which
prohibited discrimination in the provision of services by private in-
dividuals. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was then thought to have
been enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and thus to
extend only to discriminatory state actions.' 5 Four years later, in
11. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
12. 451 F.2d at 1222.
13. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a thru 2000h-6 (1970).
15. See, e.g., Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Note, Constitutional Law:
The End of Private Racial Discrimination in Housing Through Revival of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1982), 6 TULSA L.J. 146 (1970).
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Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,16 the Supreme Court held that section
1982 was enacted pursuant to the thirteenth amendment, 7 which
gave Congress the power' to forbid private acts of discrimination
which could be considered badges and incidents of slavery.'9  Several
courts of appeals since Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. have held that
what was said therein was equally applicable to contract rights pro-
tected by section 1981.20
Differences between the 1964 Act and the earlier legislation are
at once apparent. The public accommodations section of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 is a narrowly drawn statute which deals with
discrimination in four areas: hotels, food establishments, places of
entertainment and establishments physically and economically inter-
related with the first three types of covered establishments.21 It was
enacted pursuant to the commerce power; thus to come within its
coverage an establishment must in some manner affect interstate com-
merce.22  Furthermore, it contains an exemption from its coverage
for private clubs. 23  Sections 1981 and 1982, on the other hand, are
16. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). The case has been the subject of extensive scholarly
examination. See, e.g., Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom Revisited:
Some First Thoughts on Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company, 22 RUTGERs L. REv. 537
(1968); Note, Jones v. Mayer: The Thirteenth Amendment and the Federal Anti-
Discrimination Laws, 69 COLUm. L. REv. 1019 (1969).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1, states: "Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction."
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2, states: "Congress shall have power to enforce
this article by appropriate legislation."
19. The Court relied on an analysis of legislative history which at least one
commentator has found to be questionable. See Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused
and Confused Muse, in 1968 THE SUPREmE COURT REviEw 89 (P. Kurland ed. 1968).
Justice Harlan, in his dissent in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 449
(1968), predicted possible conflicts with later comprehensive acts (specifically the
Civil Rights Acts of 1968) which would be created by the Court's revival of the
earlier statute.
20. See Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970) ; Waters
v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (1970).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b), (c) (1970). The relationship to commerce was
created to take advantage of dictum in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 18 (1883).
In that case, similar legislation adopted during the Reconstruction Era was declared
unconstitutional because its enactment was not within the powers given Congress
under the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. The Supreme Court suggested that
the same laws might have been constitutional if enacted under the commerce clause.
An establishment may also be within the coverage of the 1964 Act if its
discrimination is supported by state action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-1 (1970).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970) states: "The provisions of this subchapter
shall not apply to a private club or other establishment not in fact open to the public,
19721
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
general statutes which cover discrimination in all sales of property
and all contracts.24 The 1866 Act deals only with race discrimination,
however; the 1964 statute also bars discrimination based on religion
and national origin.2 5 Problems occur when the right to use a facility
fitting the 1964 Act's definition of a private club is asserted as a con-
tract or property right ostensibly protected under the 1866 Act.
In finding that the private club exemption impliedly repealed any
inconsistent implications of the older statutes, the court of appeals in
Wheaton-Haven reasoned that since the later statute expressly pro-
tected conduct made unlawful by the earlier one such conduct could
not be unlawful. It seemed to rest its interpretation primarily upon
its reading of congressional intent, implying that if Congress acted
intentionally to protect the values of associational freedom which in-
here in private clubs by exempting them from requirements of non-
discrimination, this intent should not be thwarted by holding defend-
ants liable for such conduct under another statute.2 6
except to the extent that the facilities of such an establishment are made available
to the customers or patrons of an establishment within the scope of subsection (b)
of this section."
24. There are also differences in enforcement mechanisms. Sections 1981 and
1982 contain no enforcement provisions in themselves, but permit private plaintiffs
to seek judicially-created remedies of injunction [Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968)] or damages. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S.
229 (1969). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 may be enforced by a private plaintiff
[42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3 (1970)] but the United States Attorney General is also
given power to bring suit [42 U.S.C. § 2000a-5 (1970)] and a court has the power
to refer any suit to the Community Relations Service established by title VII if the
court feels that there is a reasonable possibility of obtaining voluntary compliance.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a-4 (1970).
25. See note 7 supra.
26. The Fourth Circuit explored in some detail the legislative history of the
1964 Act:
The Act generated an almost unparalleled amount of debate in Congress and in
the nation at large, and its exceptions were subjected to particular scrutiny.
"Mrs. Murphy's roominghouse" came into the language as a generic classification
during the debates. The remarks of both proponents and opponents of the Act
make it clear that it was intended to outlaw racial discrimination in the furnishing
of certain kinds of goods and services, except in the case of a few types of very
small businesses and private organizations, to which no prohibition against dis-
crimination was to extend.... Congressmen both favoring and opposing the enact-
ment of a public accommodations law attacked the Act as written for making
distinctions between permitted and prohibited discrimination . . . . The majority,
however, justified the exemption for private clubs as an appropriate recognition
of rights of privacy and associational preferences in cases "where freedom of
association might logically come into play .... "
451 F.2d at 1214-15 n.5. This manifestation of intent is what led the court to




This conclusion appears to be an expression of the doctrine of
repeal by implication." Repeals by implication are said to be dis-
favored by courts; when there are two statutes upon the same subject
the rule is to give effect to both if possible. 2  However, repeal by im-
plication is recognized in two situations. Where the provisions in two
acts are in irreconcilable conflict, the later one is said to repeal the
earlier to the extent of the conflict. If the later act covers the whole
subject of the earlier and is clearly intended to act as a substitute, the
earlier statute will impliedly be repealed in its entirety.2 9
It is clear from the differences between the civil rights statutes that
the 1964 Act was not meant to replace the 1866 Act in its entirety. The
essence of Judge Haynesworth's decision in Wheaton-Haven was that
there is an irreconcilable conflict between the two acts. If Congress in-
tended the exemption to promote the values inherent in private clubs and
to allow them to discriminate in their choice of members, its intent
would certainly be thwarted if plaintiffs were allowed to bring suit
for the same conduct under another statute. The requisite intent to
repeal is as clear as it can be, considering that the members of Con-
gress did not know that sections 1981 and 1982 would be applicable
to the same conduct at the time they enacted the 1964 Act.30
A similar question has arisen in a closely related area - the effect
of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"' upon section 1981. In
Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works,82 plaintiffs sued under section 1981
and title VII, alleging a discriminatory hiring policy on the part of
defendants. The issue was whether a requirement in title VII, that
only persons charged before the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
27. Some confusion results from the fact that it is not clear that the court
believed it was using the doctrine of repeal by implication. The court's statement,
"we do not suggest that a practice formerly forbidden by §§ 1981 and 1982 has,
by implication, been repealed by the failure of § 2000a, later enacted, also to prohibit
it," [451 F.2d at 1214 n.5] leads to the conclusion that the court believed it was
using some doctrine other than repeal by implication. However, it is difficult to see
what other doctrine might be relevant, particularly since the court cited only one case
in its discussion of that issue - United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939) -
which discussed the elements of the doctrine of implicit repeal en route to a holding
that neither the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act nor the Capper-Volstead
Act modified section 1 of the Sherman Act. The likely meaning of the above quoted
language is that the repeal was the result of the express prohibition contained in
the later act, not simply of its failure to prohibit the same conduct.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
29. See Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936).
30. See text accompanying notes 14-20 supra.
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e thru 2000e-15 (1970), dealing with equal employment
opportunity.
32. 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1970).
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mission could be joined in suit, extended to an action brought under
section 1981. The Seventh Circuit examined the legislative 1history,
to see if Congress would have intended repeal had it been aware of the
rights granted by the 1866 Act. The court's answer was that while the
legislative history did not compel the conclusion that Congress would
have intended to repeal absolutely the right to bring suit under sec-
tion 1981, the strong preference for resolution of disputes by concilia-
tion expressed by members of Congress suggested that the right to
sue under section 1981 would have been modified had Congress been
aware of that right.33 Therefore, the section 1981 suit was held sub-
ject to the conciliation requirement of title VII. Although other courts
have reached the opposite result,84 they have agreed with the Waters
court that the issue in employment cases is whether the existence of
different remedies in the later act is sufficient to modify the remedy
structure of the earlier one. In the Wheaton-Haven situation the
conflict is more basic than a mere struggle between contradictory
enforcement mechanisms; either defendants are exempt from all lia-
bility, as a result of the 1964 Act, or they are fully liable under the
1866 Act. In that situation, repeal by implication seems logical.
There must remain some doubt as to the applicability of the doc-
trine, however, in light of the Supreme Court's pronouncements in
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.85 In that case, the Court stated
that title II "in no way" supersedes the 1866 Act, and that "the hier-
archy of administrative machinery provided by the 1964 Act is not at
war with survival of the principles embodied in § 1982."s . While the
Court did not specifically deal with the private club exemption, and it
was apparently negating repeal of section 1982 as a whole rather than
in part, this statement might be taken to mean that section 1982 is not
affected at all by the 1964 Act.
Furthermore, the 1964 Act contains a saving clause which states
that nothing in title II shall prevent any plaintiff from enforcing rights
based on laws "not inconsistent" with that statute. It might be said
33. Id. at 486.
34. See, e.g., Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971);
Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971). The Waters case
was criticized in Note, Is 1981 Modified by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
1970 DUKE L.J. 1223, because of differences in the means of enforcement and scope
of application, and because of the Supreme Court's statements in Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co. and Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park that the earlier acts were not in
conflict with the later act.
35. 396 U.S. 229 (1969), noted in 84 HAv. L. REv. 82 (1970); 15 How. L.J.
941 (1969).
36. 396 U.S. at 237.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6(b) (1970).
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that the 1866 Act does not come within the saving clause because of
the inconsistency on the issue of private clubs. On the other hand,
it could be argued that the clause as a whole means that the enact-
ment of title II is to have no effect on any existing remedy.
II. DEFINING A TRANSFER INCIDENT TO A REAL
ESTATE TRANSACTION
There are other difficulties in reconciling the Fourth Circuit's
opinion in Wheaton-Haven with the earlier Supreme Court case. In
Sullivan, plaintiff owned two membership shares8  in Little Hunting
Park, one of which he assigned to a black person, attendant to the
latter's lease of a home owned by plaintiff. The Board of Directors
of the non-stock corporation which operated the recreational facility
refused to permit the assignment because of the lessee's race, and
Sullivan sued. The Supreme Court found that the transfer of member-
ship was incident to the lease, because there was no doubt that the
lessee paid part of his rent for the privilege of using the club. The
Court held that when conveyance of membership rights in a community
recreational facility was coupled with creation of a leasehold, the entire
transaction came under section 1982, and racial discrimination was
illegal in either part of the transaction.
The plaintiffs in Wheaton-Haven claimed a similar connection
between a real estate transaction and club membership. When a mem-
ber of the Wheaton-Haven Association sells his home and resigns his
38. The manner in which these shares were obtained is not clear from the Supreme
Court's opinion. The Wheaton-Haven court was of the opinion that Little Hunting
Park was organized and built by the subdividers of the surrounding residential land to
enhance sales, and that it was necessary that one own property in one of the sub-
divisions to join, although there was no residence requirement. The court placed some
reliance upon these facts to distinguish Little Hunting Park from the Wheaton-Haven
Association, which was organized by community members and which did not require
any land ownership. 451 F.2d at 1218. However counsel for plaintiffs in Wheaton-
Haven (who had represented the successful plaintiffs in Sullivan), claimed that Little
Hunting Park, like Wheaton-Haven, was a voluntary association organized by coin-
munity residents and that there was no requirement that members either reside in or
own property in a prescribed geographic area. See Petition for Rehearing of Plaintiffs-
Appellants at 2 and 4, Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 451 F.2d
1211 (4th Cir. 1971).
It would seem that the Wheaton-Haven court was correct in its belief that
membership in Little Hunting Park was tied to the land rather than to one's resi-
dence; otherwise it is difficult to see how members could own more than one mem-
bership share, as Sullivan uncontestedly did. Furthermore, if membership was not
tied to the land, it is difficult to see why the Supreme Court relied on the lease trans-
action, instead of dealing with the membership share itself as personal property.
1972]
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membership, his purchaser is entitled, under the by-laws, to a first
option to become a member . 9 The first option entitles its holder to
have his application for membership considered immediately, without
having to go to the end of a waiting list. The plaintiffs argued that
the first option was the same as the outright transfer permitted by
Little Hunting Park, barely disguised. The court held40 that the first
option was not the equivalent of a transfer of membership because
the membership rolls of Wheaton-Haven had never been full.4 ' Thus
the first option gave nothing, because all prospective members had a
similar "right" without purchasing the option.
The court's conclusion was correct on the facts as stated in its
opinion. The situation would be less clear if the membership rolls
had been full and there was a waiting list. The question of whether the
option would be the same as the assignment of a membership share
would then seem to depend upon whether there were nonracial criteria
for choosing members.42  If there were no criteria for membership
except race, then being vaulted over the waiting list would auto-
matically entitle a white person to membership and would be equivalent
to assignment of a membership share; a black purchaser would receive
no such benefit. If there were some other criteria, then the option
would give every purchaser only the right to be considered immediately.
While this is a right of some value it is not equivalent to the transfer
of a membership share by the transferor.
In dissent, Judge Butzner argued that the option was important
economically because a white might be able to sell his home for a
higher price than could the plaintiffs if he could assure his purchaser
of an option for membership in Wheaton-Haven if the membership
rolls became full. It is true that this effect could be construed to be an
interference with the right to sell, but it seems implausible that the
39. Members who sell their homes are not required to resign. However, each
family may have only one membership, which was not the case in Sullivan. Member-
ship is not transferable, unless the first option provisioin is considered a transfer of
some membership rights.
40. Consideration of this argument was actually unnecessary, since Dr. Press's
transferor was not a member of Wheaton-Haven. There was, therefore, no transac-
tion which would have given Dr. Press any sort of interest in Wheaton-Haven. 451
F.2d at 1217 n.14. The court, nevertheless, discussed the option issue at length.
41. The court relied on defendant's assertion at oral argument that membership,
limited to 325 families, had been held at 260 families for several years. 451 F.2d at
1213 n.1. Counsel for plaintiffs vehemently contested this assertion. He stated, citing
defendant's answers to interrogatories, that as of March 1, 1968, the membership rolls
were full. Petition for Rehearing of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 2, Tillman v. Wheaton-
Haven Recreation Ass'n, 451 F.2d 1211 (4th Cir. 1971).
42. See notes 58-66 infra and accompanying text.
[VOL. XXXII
TILLMAN V. WHEATON-HAVEN
scope of the statute was intended to include such an indirect inter-
ference.4 3 Defendant's action was not conduct that directly interfered
with the right to sell, but was conduct arguably prohibited under other
statutes which indirectly created an opportunity to discriminate.
Plaintiffs also argued that Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,
was controlling because Wheaton-Haven drew its members from an
area so geographically delimited that the purchase of a home in the
area impliedly carried with it the right to membership in the Associa-
tion. The court rejected this argument, finding that in Sullivan owner-
ship of land was the criterion for admission and membership was
tied to acquiring rights in a subdivision developed by the persons who
had built the recreational facilities, whereas the Wheaton-Haven Asso-
ciation was a voluntary grouping of individuals; the radius require-
ment was merely an area preference, and there was no connection
between membership and ownership of land.
Judge Haynesworth ignored other possible applications of section
1981 and 1982."4 He did not discuss the possibility that section 1981
might provide relief on the ground that the plaintiff was denied the
right to make a membership contract because of his race.45  Several
cases have held that a ticket of admission to a place of entertainment
constitutes a contract between the facility and the user and thus have
provided a remedy for refusal of admission. 6 There would seem to
be a similar contract arising between the Wheaton-Haven Associa-
tion and a member. This argument was put before the Fourth Circuit
43. An argument can be made that there is an interference with the right to sell.
One case which would support this argument is Contract Buyers League v. F & F
Investment, 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D. Ill. 1969), which held that charging blacks higher
prices for property than whites would have been charged is a violation of section
1982. However, even this case concerned a direct relationship between a buyer and
a seller, and, therefore, would be weak authority in the Wheaton-Haven situation,
where the impediment was created by a stranger to the sale. If an extension were
made in the statute's scope to hold organizations liable for such indirect effects, the
transactions which would be included would be myriad - certainly more than could
have been imagined when section 1982 was enacted. See generally Bush v. Kaim, 297
F. Supp. 151, 162 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (discussion of limitations of section 1982).
44. This oversight may be attributable to a conclusion by the court that since
it read the private club exemption into sections 1981 and 1982 and concluded that
Wheaton-Haven was a private club, there was no need to consider other possibilities.
45. The court stated that admission to membership "is not incident to any con-
tract" if it was not incident to the contract of sale of the real property. 451 F.2d at
1216 n.11. However, it failed to consider the membership agreement itself as a con-
tract. As noted above [note 5 and accompanying text], the ban on racial discrimina-
tion in making contracts has survived the passage of the 1964 Act.
46. See Scott v. Young, 421 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1970), aff'g 307 F. Supp. 1005
(E.D. Va. 1969); Valle v. Stengel, 176 F.2d 697 (3d Cir. 1949).
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by the plaintiffs,4 ' but apparently to no avail.48  Plaintiffs also argued
that a membership share in the association was personal property49
and thus was within the scope of section 1982 independent of the sale
of real estate. Either of these grounds seems to be adequate to bring
the transaction within the Civil Rights Act of 1866. Without so stat-
ing, the court must have assumed that the private club exemption
negated these two theories, leaving that exemption as the crux of
the decision.
III. WHAT MAKES A CLUB PRIVATE?
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains no standards for determin-
ing what organizations qualify as private clubs.50 Courts have, there-
fore, developed qualifications on a case-by-case basis.51 There is no
single test; it is said that all factors must be taken into account in
determining what is basically a factual question.5 2 Among the factors
considered are advertising,5" the members' reasons for organizing, 4
47. Brief for Appellants at 7, Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n,
451 F.2d 1211 (4th Cir. 1971).
48. The court never dealt with the argument, although it recited it. 451 F.2d
at 1213.
49. Brief for Appellants at 7, Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n,
451 F.2d 1211 (4th Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court implied in Sullivan that mem-
bership is personal property within the scope of section 1982. 396 U.S. at 236.
However, the Court cited no authority for this proposition and there appears to be
none. Justice Harlan, dissenting, took strong issue with the majority's suggestion.
396 U.S. at 248.
The Wheaton-Haven plaintiffs cited Page v. Edmunds, 187 U.S. 596 (1903),
and Hyde v. Woods, 94 U.S. 523 (1876), to support their contention, but neither case
appears to be directly on point.
50. See note.23 supra.
51. See generally United States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370 (E.D. La. 1969);
Note, Public Accommodations Laws and the Private Club, 54 GEo. L.J. 915 (1966);
Note, Public Accommodations: What is a Private Club?, 30 MONT. L. REv. 47 (1968).
52. See, e.g., Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A., 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson Lake, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D.
Ala. 1970).
54. While one court has stated that the members' reason for organizing is not a
relevant criterion, Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A., 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968), several courts
have held that the fact that a club was formed solely to avoid obeying the Public
Accommodations Act aids in finding the "club" to be a sham. United States v. Jordan,
302 F. Supp. 370 (E.D. La. 1969) (restaurant converted to private club after blacks
began to seek admittance); United States v. Northwest Louisiana Restaurant Club,
256 F. Supp. 151 (W.D. La. 1966) (restaurants solicited to become part of club to
avoid the 1964 Act). This is especially true when the same establishment was form-
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financial structure55 and the degree of internal democracy." The
defendant club bears the burden of showing that its organization is
private and, therefore, exempt from statutory coverage.57
Wheaton-Haven has all of the technical attributes of a private
club. It does not publicly solicit members or advertise its facilities.
The club was organized in 1958, long before passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, and there has been no suggestion of racist motives
in its establishment. The evidence was scant on the issue of finances,
but there was a suggestion that the sum of dues paid did not exceed
the club's expenses. There was no testimony indicating that any
individual or group profited from the club's operation. Members of
the Board of Directors had to be members of the club. Regular mem-
bership meetings were held, and participation by members was high.
The factor, however, which seems to have been most important
in the cases considering whether an organization is a private club, is
that of membership and admission policies. Offering to serve all the
white persons in a geographic area is said to be inconsistent with the
nature of a private club.5" Genuine selectivity on some reasonable
basis is important.59 There must be some established machinery for
admission of new members, such as a membership committee com-
posed of members.8 0 If only a nominal membership fee is charged,
and an admission fee is charged each time the facilities are used, an
establishment will probably be characterized as a public accommoda-
erly operated as a segregated public restaurant. United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d
523 (5th Cir. 1968).
55. If all the profits from a club's operation are retained by one person or a small
group of persons, the organization is considered a proprietary establishment, not a club.
United States v. Jack Sabin's Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. La. 1967). Courts
have consistently looked through such devices as management contracts between a
paper "club" and the actual proprietor. See, e.g., Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp.
1143 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
56. Bell v. Kenwood Golf & Country Club, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 753 (D. Md. 1970).
Courts look to see if members actually control the club.
57. See, e.g., Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A., 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968); Daniel v. Paul,
395 F.2d 118 (8th Cir. 1968).
58. Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A., 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968). See Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1969). The Court presented no facts in
support of this conclusion, and was not considering the 1964 Act.
59. Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A., 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968) ; United States v. Johnson
Lake, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D. Ala. 1970); United States v. Jack Sabin's
Private Club, 265 F. Supp, 90 (E.D.. La. 1967). The fact that there is no limit upon
membership except the size of the facilities indicates that an organization lacks the
selectivity of a private club.
60. See Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
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tion.61 Regular admittance of nonmembers who are not bona fide
guests is an indication that the establishment is public, not private.
6 2
Wheaton-Haven's claim for private club consideration seems least
convincing under the last and most important standard. That only
members and bona fide guests may use the pool merely makes a find-
ing that a facility is a private club possible, not inevitable. That a
member's initial investment is relatively heavy and annual dues are
substantial suggest a financial standard for membership, but in the
absence of evidence that the charges were beyond the means of a large
number of the potential white applicants, such a standard does not
suggest any nonracial exclusiveness. That the applicants must be
approved by the Board of Directors and that there was a policy of
keeping the membership small prove nothing in absence of proof that
these rules ever operated to exclude anyone other than blacks. That
the reason given for rejection of the Presses application was their race
creates a strong impression that race was the membership standard
and all whites were acceptable applicants.6 3
The issue that is raised by the lack of selectivity demonstrated -
though it was not raised by the plaintiffs in Wheaton-Haven - is
whether an organization which is managed as a private, member-
controlled club may use the statutory exemption to protect discrimi-
nation solely on the basis of race. In view of the fact that the 1964
Act was adopted to remove race64 as a factor in the provision of services
and opportunities, it would be inconsistent to protect from its strictures
clubs whose only basis of selectivity was the forbidden criterion. On the
other hand, tradition, ethnic pride and identification and, most im-
portant, constitutionally protected freedom of association"5 militate
against judicial inquiry into the membership standards of genuine
61. See, e.g., United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1968).
62. United States v. Northwest Louisiana Restaurant Club, 256 F. Supp. 151
(W.D. La. 1966).
63. The Wheaton-Haven court tried to marshal facts to overcome the conclusion
that only blacks were excluded. It said that some considerations of social and financial
standing were implicit in the club's operations and that some whites had been rejected
informally, though the latter "fact" did not appear in the club's records. These "facts"
do not seem to satisfy the requirement that there must be some reasonable standards
for admission, which would seem to represent a failure of defendant to sustain its
burden of proof. The court, of course, did not so find.
64. As well as color, religion and national origin. See note 7 supra.
65. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179 (1972) (Douglas,
J., dissenting). Justice Douglas, in asserting that the first amendment guarantees a
"zone of privacy," stated that "the fact that the Moose Lodge allows only Caucasions
to join or come as guests is constitutionally irrelevant, as is the decision of the Black
Muslims to admit to their services only members of their race." Id., 179-80. See also
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Comment, Association, Privacy and
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''clubs," in which people associate for a common purpose or to achieve
a common goal.
66
The solution, if one is sought,67 may be to permit judicial scrutiny
of membership standards under a standard similar to the one developed
for employment standards in Griggs v. Duke Power Co."s in those
cases in which a "private club" is serving the same function as a place
of public accommodation. Thus, a dining club, a community swim-
ing pool or a roller rink would have to demonstrate either that its
admission standards were actually nondiscriminatory - that is, they
did not exclude members of one race more than of another out of
proportion to the possible membership pool - or that its standards
bore some relationship to the club's purpose - for example, requiring
ability to swim or ownership of a bathing suit for membership in a
swim club. Organizations having a purpose other than the provision
of "goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommoda-
tions"69 within the meaning of the 1964 Civil Rights Act would be
permitted to exclude people from membership on any basis whatsoever,
in their members' exercise of freedom of association. Thus, churches,
political groups and chess clubs, for example, could restrict their mem-
berships to a single race without inviting scrutiny under the 1964 Act.
Such a reconciliation of the public accommodations section of the
1964 Civil Rights Act with freedom of association would end the use
the Private Club: The Constitutional Conflict, 5 HARV. CIv. RIGHTS-Crv. LiBS. L. REv.
460 (1970).
66. A case that might be relevant on the question of permissible standards in
light of the purposes of the Civil Rights Act is Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971), which invalidated under title VII of the 1964 Act employment criteria
which were fair on their face but had a discriminatory effect on minority applicants
or employees. The Court held that such criteria could be used by employers only if
they had a demonstrable relation to job performance. See Note, Employment Dis-
crimination: The Burden Is on Business, 31 MD. L. REv. 255 (1971).
By analogy, an organization dedicated to studying Southern victories in the
Civil War or an association concerned with the culture of a black African nation
might have a single race membership without setting a racial criterion if similar views
on the issue under discussion were the standard. If, however, a member of the "ex-
cluded" race met the reasonable criteria for membership, the Griggs test would
mandate his acceptance. This does not seem to comport with Justice Douglas' under-
standing of freedom of association. See note 65 supra.
67. The Court could choose to escape the issue by referring to its earlier state-
ments on the subject in Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (dictum), and Sullivan
v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). In both of those cases the Court
found an organization not to be a private club, chiefly because of the absence of a
"plan or purpose of exclusiveness." 396 U.S. at 236. Neither opinion contained an
extensive examination of the tension between freedom of association and the effort to
open American society to all individuals.
68. See note 66 supra.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a) (1970).
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of devices to evade the public integration contemplated by the Act.
It would avoid the public examination of truly and understandably
private organizations feared by supporters of civil rights activity.70
It would require that persons do their public swimming, dining and
skating in integrated groups.
IV. CONCLUSION
Certiorari has been granted in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recrea-
tion Association, Inc.71 Plaintiffs are seeking reversal by the Supreme
Court primarily upon the grounds that the Fourth Circuit failed to
apply Sullivan correctly to the Wheaton-Haven situation.
A more important issue for the Supreme Court to consider would
be the effect of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 upon the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. Conflict between the two statutes is bound to become
more frequent, and it is essential that the relationship be delineated to
insure both uniformity and maximum efficiency in their application.7"
The proper result would be affirmance of the Wheaton-Haven court's
decision upon this point; the result otherwise would be a clear frus-
tration of congressional intent.
A second area of confusion the court might clear up is that of
how far Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park should extend. If the Fourth
Circuit was correct in finding only a tenuous relationship of property
ownership to Wheaton-Haven Association membership and limited
value in a first option, extension of the holding of Sullivan to the
Wheaton-Haven facts would represent a major extension of the
coverage of the 1866 Civil Rights Act. On the other hand, affirmance
of the Fourth Circuit's view of the limited scope of Sullivan might
inspire the use of artificial devices to separate swim club membership
from property ownership to avoid the impact of the public accommoda-
tions sections of the 1964 Act.
70. The Supreme Court has painstakingly protected civil rights organizations
from having to open membership lists to the scrutiny of the public or of public officials
on the ground that it would chill the exercise of freedom of association. N.A.A.C.P.
v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963) ; N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). Justice
Douglas' dissenting opinion in the Moose Lodge case indicates that he continues to
place a high value on associational freedom. See note 65 supra.
71. 406 U.S. 916 (1972).
72. The same problem of repeal by implication could arise, for example, in an
action by an individual claiming racial discrimination in the rental of a unit in an
owner-occupied two- or three-unit dwelling exempt from the nondiscrimination re-
quirements of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1970), but
obviously covered by the 1866 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970). Similar
associational considerations would be presented in a case of that nature. See note
26 srupra.
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The most significant issue for the Court to discuss would be
whether the private club exemption may be claimed by an association
displaying a total lack of selectivity in membership except on the basis
of race. In view of the measure of regard displayed by the Court for
freedom of association in the recent past, it might hold that the issue
of membership criteria is not a permissible area of inquiry in deciding
whether an organization is a private club. Such a holding might
result in the emasculation of title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Caught between a penumbral constitutional right and a funda-
mental social policy decision, the Supreme Court might well sidestep
the question of whether definable membership standards are the heart
of the judicial test for private club status.
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